Michigan Law Review
Volume 46

Issue 4

1948

BILLS AND NOTES-CONSTRUCTION OF NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS AND CONTEMPORANEOUS WRITTEN
AGREEMENTS
Ralph J. Isackson
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
Ralph J. Isackson, BILLS AND NOTES-CONSTRUCTION OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND
CONTEMPORANEOUS WRITTEN AGREEMENTS, 46 MICH. L. REV. 555 (1948).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/8

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS

555

RECENT DECISIONS
BILLS AND NOTES-CONSTRUCTION OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND
CONTEMPORANEOUS WRITTEN AGREEMENTS--On April 12, 1938, M executed a demand promissory note, negotiable in form, payable to the order of
his daughter, the plaintiff. Simultaneously M prepared and attached a written
instrument to the note stating that the plaintiff agreed that she would not attempt
to collect the note until M died. The attached instruments were delivered to
plaintiff immediately after execution. M died May 23, 1945. Plaintiff, who
held the instruments from the date of execution without making any de;mand
for payment, :filed the note with the defendant, M's administrator, as a claim
against M's estate. The defendant objected to paying the note, and the probate
court disallowed plaintiff's claim. The district court reversed, and defendant
appealed. Held, for the plaintiff. The note did not become due and payable
until M's death, since instruments executed at fhe same time as part of the same
transaction become, in the eyes of the law, one instrument, and will be read
and construed together. In re Holtorfs Estate, (Minn. 1947) 28 N.W. (2d)
1 55•
Courts generally follow the rule that where promissory notes and contemporaneous written agreements are executed as part of the same transaction
they will be construed together as one instrument in a controversy between the
original parties to the instruments,1 or their legal representatives. 2 This is true
even though the note makes no reference to the collateral agreement. 3 The
Minnesota court emphatically declares the two instruments, to be considered as
one, but makes no indication that its ruling is confined only to actions between
the original parties or others taking with notice.4 Such an integration immediately causes one to believe that courts in so holding frequently overlook a
fundamental difference in the doctrine of consideration in negotiable instruments
as compared to simple contracts. If the payee sues on a negotiable instrument
consideration is presumed, and the burden of proving want of consideration is on
the maker. 5 However, in an action on a simple contract, the plaintiff must
plead and prove consideration.6 So, in a given case, an incorporation of the
1
l DuNNELL, MINN. DIGEST, § 880 (1927); Myrick v. Purcell, 95 Minn.
133, 103 N.W. 902 (1905); 10 C.J.S., Bills al).d Notes, § 44 (b) (1938). This
rule applies also to third parties taking with notice of the agreement. But see Aigler,
"Conditions in Bills and Notes," 26 MICH. L. REV. 471 at 494 (1928).
2
As a general rule, a contractual obligation survives the death of the obligor.
The exception to the rule occurs when the promise which is made calls for performance
in person by the obligor, and he dies before performance is due. See GRISMORE, CoNTRACTS, § 173 (1947).
8
17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 298 (1939).
4
"Instruments executed at the same time, for the same purpose, and in the
course of the same transaction, are, in the eye of the law, one instrument, and will be
read and construed together." Principal case at 157.
5 N.I.L., §§ 24 and 27; I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,§ 221 (1936). Similarly, the
presumption of consideration is frequently given to non-negotiable notes. See Goodrich, "Nonnegotiable Bills and Notes," 5 lowA L. BULL. 65 at 70 (1920).
6
17 C.J.S., Contracts, 536 (1939); I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 107 (1936).
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two instruments into one contract may have the effect of placing the burden
of proof on the plaintiff despite the fact that his action is on a negotiable instrument. 7 One may also wonder whether the court would similarly decide that
the note and the contemporaneo1,1s agreement are one instrument, for the purpose of determining the negotiability of the note, if that question were raised
by a holder 8 who had no notice of the existence of the agreement. If it would
so hold, then it would seem that the note is non-negotiable in its inception, on
the theory that resort must be had to the collateral agreement to determine the
extent of the promissory language.9 The Minnesota court has frequently held
in cases involving negotiable notes containing references to a contemporaneous
securing mortgage that the negotiability of the note is not destroyed unless the
reference is of an express incorporating nature making the mortgage a part of
the note.10 It would follow that the court will probably limit its declaration
in the principal case solely to those situations where the contestants are original
parties or successors with notice, and where negotiability is not in issue.11 To
hold otherwise would certainly conflict with our commercial 'policy of promoting
the negotiability of notes, so many of which are commonly issued with contemporaneously executed written instruments.
Ralph J. Isackson
1 N.I.L., § 25 states "Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple
.contract." However, that which may be sufficient to support a promise on a negotiable
instrument may not be sufficient consideration for a simple contract. For example, a
promise to pay a precedent debt is not usually sufficient consideration on an ordinary
contract, but it is sufficient for a negotiable instrument given to discharge the debt.
See I WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, § 108 (1936), and cases cited.
8 The principal case raised no question of negotiability, nor were there third
parties, taking without notice, involved.
9
Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928), is one of many
cases declaring a note to be non-negotiable if reference is required to another doc. ument to determine whether the promise is unconditional. But cf. Pollard v. Tobin,
2II Wis. 405, 247 N.W. 453 (1933). This case represents a line of authority which
permits looking to the collateral document to see if the terms contained therein impose on the promise conditions repugnant to negotiability. This view permits an
instrument which is not negotiable upon execution, because of words in the note
subjecting the promise to pay to conditions expressed in the other document, to
become negotiable, if, upon examination of the other document it is discovered that
the conditions expressed therein are, in fact, really not repugnant to negotiability.
See Aigler, "Conditions in Bills and Notes," 26 MrcH. L. REv. 471 at 494 (1928).
It should be noted that a promise to pay upon death, as expressed in the principal
case, has long been held sufficiently certain to satisfy the time requirement for bills
and notes. See Cooke v. Colehan, 2 Str. 1217, 93 Eng. Rep. II40 (1795).
1
King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 158 Minn. 481 at 489, 198 N.W. 798 (1917).
In White v. Miller, 52 Minn. 367 at 373 (1893) the court said: "The note is
always regarded as a separate and distinct instrument, enforceable according to its
terms, and independently of the mortgage." See also Thorpe v. Mindeman, 123
Wis. 149, IOI N.W. 417 (1904).
11
For a general discussion of the problem, see Bailey, "Negotiable Instruments
and Contemporaneously Executed Written Contracts," 13 TEX. L. REv. 278 (1935)
and 14 TEX. L. REv. 307 (1935).
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